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Abstract
The single most likely way to leave the unemployment insurance (Ul) register in 
Hungary is not by getting a job but simply by running out of entitlement to benefit. 
This situation raises two questions. First, what are the implications of the cessation 
of Ul for living standards? Second, does Ul exhaustion have much effect on the 
probability of getting a job? This paper reports on preliminary analysis of these 
issues with a survey of persons exhausting entitlement to Ul in Summer 1995.
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As in other countries in Central and Eastern Europe and in common with most 
OECD countries, Hungary has relied on limited-duration Unemployment Insurance 
(Ul) as the primary form of income support for the unemployed. However, a low 
outflow rate from unemployment coupled with progressive reductions in entitlement 
periods to Ul have resulted in exhaustion of Ul entitlement becoming a very common 
event Indeed, the single most likely way for an entrant to the Ul register to leave it 
is not by getting a job but simply by running out of entitlement to benefit. This 
situation is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the monthly outflow rate from the 
stock of Ul recipients to jobs and the outflow for other reasons among which 
exhaustion of entitlement overwhelmingly dominates. On average only about 5 
percent of the stock of Ul recipients left the register each month to get a job in 1994 
and the first half of 1995, while the total outflow rate was about 15 percent. The 
diagram also shows the increasing importance of exhaustion - there is a growing 
gap between the total outflow rate and the re-employment rate.
This situation raises two related sets of questions First, what are the 
implications of the cessation of Ul for living standards? How many of those that 
exhaust Ul go on to receive income-tested Social Benefit (SB) and what other 
sources of income support within the household exist for those that do not? Second, 
does Ul exhaustion have much effect on the probability of getting a job? Are Ul 
recipients more likely to leave the register as the day their benefit runs out 
approaches? Is there a sudden surge in the probability of finding a job when benefit 
actually expires?
Hitherto it has not been possible to answer these questions adequately. 
Social Benefit is a comparatively new scheme in Hungary and few administrative 
data exist on its receipt, despite this benefit now being received by more registered 
unemployed persons than is Ul. Analysis of benefit receipt and outflows using Ul 
register data, as in our earlier work, answers a number of questions about the 
behaviour of those receiving Ul but since observation finishes by definition at the 



























































































This situation provided the motivation for the survey on which this paper 
reports. Section 2 describes the data collected In a nutshell, a cohort of 
individuals starting Ul receipt in the Spring of 1994 were followed through the Ul 
registers over the following 12 months A large sample of those exhausting Ul 
entitlement were contacted and interviewed about 3-4 months after their Ul expired.
Information was collected on their labour market experiences since exhaustion, on 
their household characteristics, and on claims and receipt of SB. In Sections 3 and 
4 we use simple non-parametric methods to analyse the probability of leaving 
unemployment to get a job (Section 3) or to go to some other destination (Section 
4). In both cases we analyse the full inflow cohort, joining the follow-up survey data 
to those from the Ul register. In this way we are able to compare the probabilities of 
exit before and after expiry of Ul entitlement. Section 5 looks at SB, showing the 
frequency of receipt of this benefit and the characteristics of those who do receive. 
Section 6 concludes, summarising what has been learnt and what conclusions can 
be drawn for policy and outlining the ways in which the preliminary analysis 
presented in this paper needs to be developed
2. Ul REGISTER DATA AND THE EXHAUSTER SURVEY
Construction of the data base we use was in two stages, which we begin by 
outlining. First, we selected all persons in two work history groups who entered the 
Ul register in April or May 1994, a group of about 28,000 individuals. These 
individuals were followed through the Ul register for one year Second, a 
subsample of those individuals in this inflow cohort who exhausted Ul entitlement 
was interviewed in Summer 1995 about 3-4 months after exhaustion We now put 
more details on this outline
Eligibility to benefit in the Hungarian Ul system depends on employment 
history in the four years prior to a claim At least 12 months employment is required 
to qualify for benefits The period of entitlement then depends on the length of the 
work record; 12 month employment results in the minimum of 3 months of 
entitlement, 4 years employment brings the maximum of 1 year of entitlement. 




























































































maximum). An individual cannot be followed in the Ul benefit register beyond the 
end of the entitlement period - it is a register of Ul benefit payments and not a 
register of unemployment more widely defined This is an important drawback of 
using register data for analysis of outflows from unemployment and one motivation 
for conducting a follow-up survey among Ul exhausters was to extend the period of 
observation beyond the end of the entitlement period.
We concentrated on the two groups in the April/May 1994 inflow to Ul with 
the longest entitlement periods, of 12 and 11 months, which result from work 
histories in the four years prior to claim of continuous employment and 43-47 
months employment respectively. These groups accounted for nearly two-thirds of 
the total inflow, with the maximum entitlement group alone representing nearly half. 
The alternative strategy of sampling each group would have led to a small sample 
size in many eligibility groups It would also have greatly extended the period over 
which we observed exhaustion of Ul and this would have caused problems for field­
work, given that we wished to ensure that interviews on the post-exhaustion 
employment history took place not too long after the date of exhaustion so as to 
reduce recall errors.
These two work history groups were followed through the Ul registers, noting 
exits as and when they occurred (All individuals in the inflow cohort in the two 
relevant work history groups enter the data base that we constructed.) The 
following information on the individuals and their Ul claims was taken from the 
register: sex, age, educational level, region (county), local employment office, way 
of termination of last employment, work history in last 4 years used to determine Ul 
entitlement, previous earnings figure used to determine Ul, Ul benefit level, reason 
of end of benefit payments, and length of benefit spell
We then conducted a follow-up survey in Summer 1995 of the 12,600 
persons that exhausted entitlement. These persons represented 44 percent of the 
original inflow in the two entitlement groups concerned Financial restrictions forced 
us at this point to take a (stratified) random sub-sample of individuals to include in 
the survey, and we used sampling fractions of about 30 percent for the 12 month 
entitlement group and 60 percent for the 11 month group. Individuals were traced to 




























































































with a total of 4,661 individuals, which represented a response rate of nearly 90 
percent. In 6 percent of cases the interviewer did not find the person at home (we 
tried to contact everybody at least twice) The potential respondents moved to an 
unknown new address in 2.5 percent of the cases There were only a very small 
number of refusals: 0.6 percent of the sample The rest of unsuccessful interviews 
(1.3 percent) are due to other reasons, eg the person was not known at the address 
or the address did not exits
Interviews were conducted between 9 and 27 weeks after the date of Ul 
exhaustion (the mean lag was 18 weeks) Respondents were asked to report their 
labour market status in each fortnight since the date of Ul exhaustion, and 
additionally to report the precise date that a job was first found, excluding casual 
work. The outcome of any claim to SB was recorded. We also collected information 
on household composition and labour force status of other members of the 
household together with the current earnings, if any, of the respondent and spouse 
Interviewing was conducted by local employment office clerks, except in Budapest 
and several large towns where we used a professional survey agency (about 1 in 6 
individuals in the survey lived in these areas). This restricted the range of questions 
we felt we could ask if we were going to maintain the goodwill of respondents The 
surveyed individual himself or herself provided the information requested in 81 
percent of cases if male and 92 percent of cases if female In other cases another 
household member provided the information (almost always the spouse).
Table 1 compares a number of observed personal characteristics of (i) the 
total inflow in the two work history groups, (ii) all those in these groups who 
exhausted Ul, and (iii) the sub-set of exhausters who were survey respondents The 
comparisons are made separately for the two eligibility groups. Differences between 
(i) and (ii) reflect differences between the characteristics of those who leave the 
register to a job or some other destination and those who exhaust Ul. For example, 
those who exhaust tend to have lower education, are more likely to have left their 
last job voluntarily, and are more likely to live in high unemployment counties In 
the case of the 11 month eligibility group, comparison of exhausters selected for and 
responding to the follow-up survey and those not in the survey sample show no 




























































































of last gross earnings and last Ul payment. Although there are again no differences 
in distributions of characteristics such as gender, education, region etc for the 12 
months eligibility group, respondents do have slightly lower past earnings and 
hence Ul benefits and these differences are significant at the 5 percent level With 
this small proviso, the sample therefore seems representative of all exhausters
3. THE PROBABILITY OF GETTING A JOB
We begin by looking at the probability of getting a job in the period prior to 
the expiry of Ul entitlement, distinguishing between men and women and between 
those with 360 days of Ul entitlement and those with 330 days. Taking the two 
groups together, 29 percent of spells finish in a job exit (compared to 44 percent in 
exhaustion) The figure is much higher for men than for women - 34 percent 
compared to 25 percent.
Results are shown in Figures 2-5 and are based on the full inflow cohort in 
March and April 1994 in the two entitlement groups These figures show the 
probability of leaving the Ul register to take up work in a given interval of time 
conditional on having survived in the register to the start of that interval, i.e. the 
hazard of exit to a job. The intervals are defined as one week long for those with 
360 days of entitlement and two weeks in the case of 330 days. Results are 
obtained using the Kaplan-Meier non-parametric estimator, treating spells of Ul that 
finish in exit to states other than work as being censored at the point of exit. The 
vertical lines in the diagrams show the 95 percent confidence intervals for the 
estimates of the hazard. A job is defined to include both employment and self- 
employment that are subsidised by the state, as well as “normal" jobs that receive 
no subsidy (normal jobs make up the great majority).
Looking first at men with 360 days of entitlement (Figure 2), we see that the 
hazard is fairly flat for most of the period. There is a bit of a dip around the 200 day 
mark, which falls near the end of the calendar year (a period when hiring is less 
frequent) but the most notable variation comes right at the end of the period. The 
hazard four and two weeks prior to exhaustion is about 50 percent higher than for 




























































































level. The size of the confidence intervals show that these are certainly significant 
changes. Turning to women with the same entitlement period (Figure 3), there is an 
even bigger rise in the final week, the hazard here being some three times higher 
than in most earlier periods. The final 4-6 weeks in general has a higher hazard too 
and there is some indication of a rising hazard through much of the last three 
months. In general the women have lower hazards compared to the men, which is 
what we expected from earlier work - the outflow rate of women is lower than that of 
men Figures 4 and 5 for claimants with 330 days entitlement show some results 
that are in common with Figures 2 and 3 and some that are different. Men again 
display a rise in the hazard in the final period, now defined as two weeks long, and 
in fact it appears to rise progressively from the 200 day mark. Women with 330 
days entitlement, however, appear to display little or no rise in the hazard at all as 
the ending of entitlement draws near
These results are not dissimilar to those we have obtained in earlier work 
with other inflow cohorts of Ul recipients and indicate that although the hazard does 
rise somewhat as the point of Ul exhaustion approaches, the changes are not that 
great However, as with the earlier work, these results tell us nothing about what 
happens after Ul is finished. Figures 6 to 9 address this issue, using the data from 
the follow-up survey of exhausters. The hazards in the first 12 months (Figures 6 
and 7) or 11 months (8 and 9) are estimated using the full inflow with these periods 
of entitlement, as in Figures 2-5. Beyond this point the hazards are estimated using 
the exhauster survey data. Spells for those persons exhausting entitlement who 
were not included in the survey are treated as censored at the point of exhaustion. 
The less than 100 percent sampling rate in the survey explains why the confidence 
intervals jump in size at this point. Intervals for estimation for the hazard are again 
taken as one week long Prior to exhaustion we are modelling exit from the Ul 
register; following exhaustion we treat as remaining in the “base state” (and hence 
still “at risk” of exit to a job) individuals who report in the period concerned that they 
were in one of three categories: (i) did casual work (with or without job search), (ii) 
looked for a job but could not find one, (iii) did not look for a job or were not able to 
work. (All other exits are treated as censoring.) A job exit pre-exhaustion is defined 




























































































are working as an employee, self-employment, and working in a family business 
We do not include casual work in the definition of a job exit since this can only be 
identified post-exhaustion. And we expect that casual work performed pre­
exhaustion is most likely to be done illicitly, while still in receipt of Ul
Among Ul exhausters in the survey, exit to a job accounts for 23 percent of all 
recorded exits and as in the pre-exhaustion period (although the difference is not as 
great) the figure is greater for men than for women - 25 percent compared to 21 
percent (These percentages are based on weighted data to take account of the 
oversampling of those with 330 days of Ul entitlement.)
Starting again with men with 360 days entitlement (Figure 6) we see that the 
rise in the final month is nothing compared to the huge jump in the hazard in the first 
week following exhaustion The hazard in this week is some six to seven times 
higher than in earlier periods. It then immediately falls back to around a level similar 
to that in the last week of Ul for the next four weeks. Thereafter the hazard oscillates 
around a level about 25 percent higher than during most of the period when Ul was 
being paid. Figures 7-9 demonstrate the same surge in the hazard for the week 
immediately following exhaustion for women and for those with 330 days of Ul 
entitlement and the order of magnitude of the rise is similar - about a five to seven­
fold jump. And again, following this first post-exhaustion week, the hazard 
immediately falls back to a level that typically is similar to that in the final weeks of 
Ul entitlement before settling down to a level somewhat above that in much of the 
entitlement period.
As many as 30 percent of all recorded post-exhaustion job exits come in the 
first week following exhaustion and many of these are on the first day It seems clear 
that there is a group of persons who are timing their return to work to coincide 
exactly with the point of Ul exhaustion, but it is important to keep the size of this 
group in perspective. If we take all job exits right from the start of Ul receipt up until 
our survey date (weighting the post-exhaustion exits to take account of the sampling 
from that point), the “week 53" exits account for 8 percent, or only 2 percent of the 
entire entry cohort. One possibility is that only these exits would be affected greatly 
by changes in the Ul entitlement period - we have seen that the post-exhaustion 




























































































hazards have a fairly flat profile This suggests that changes in Ul duration or 
benefit levels would be a very crude tool with which to change incentives for the 
persons concerned and that a more appropriate policy response would be to try to 
identify these claimants early on in their Ul spells and disqualify them from benefit or 
at least administer their claims in such a way as to pressurise them into earlier exits.
4. OTHER EXITS
We now look at exits to other labour market states and see how the 
probability of this happening changes before and after the point of Ul exhaustion 
Figures 10 (360 days entitlement) and 11 (330 days entitlement) show the estimated 
hazards for exits to a mixed collection of labour market states, where in this case we 
have straightaway combined the Ul register data with those from the follow-up 
survey The hazards are estimated pooling the data for men and women, taking 
two-week intervals. The states included in other exits are given below, and are 
chosen so as to be as comparable as possible pre- and post-exhaustion (Exits to 
the child care benefits GYES and GYED cannot be identified separately pre­
exhaustion from benefit suspensions, which may occur for various reasons, and 
spells that end this way in the pre-exhaustion period are treated as censored.) The 




public work scheme 
disqualification from Ul receipt 




child care benefit/allowance (GYES, GYED, GYET)
Pre-exhaustion, these other exits account for 21 percent of all exits (including 
exhaustion). In contrast to job exits, the figure is much higher for women - 28 
percent compared to 15 percent for men. Post-exhaustion (using weighted data) 




























































































is still in the base state at interview) with the figures for men and women being 10 
and 12 percent respectively.
The figures display similar features. There is an enormous rise in the hazard 
at 6 months into the period of Ul entitlement and then again in the interval 
immediately following exhaustion. For those with 360 days entitlement, the spike at 
6 months is larger while the opposite is true for those with 330 days The spike at 6 
months is caused by exit to early retirement - 6 months’s receipt of Ul is required 
before an individual qualifies for early retirement. However, not all early retirement 
happens at this point - only about 40 percent. The second spike is caused largely 
by exit to disability pension and, in the case of women, to receipt of child care 
payments
We finish this section by looking at the distribution of the follow-up survey 
sample across all recorded labour market states at two points in time, the fortnight 
immediately following Ul exhaustion and the three month point, distinguishing 
between men and women. Table 2 covers both those who received 12 months Ul 
and those who received 11 months (with appropriate weighting to take account of 
the different sampling fractions). (The figures at the 3 month point exclude 5 
percent of the sample who are traced for shorter periods in the survey.)
Immediately post-exhaustion, 7 percent of the sample report doing casual 
work and many of these could of course have also been doing such work while 
receiving Ul. Casual work is clearly more common among men than women. 
Consistent with the Labour Force Survey results presented in Micklewright and 
Nagy (1995), a higher proportion of women report that they were not looking for 
work - 14 percent compared to 8 percent of men Around 70 percent of both men 
and women report that they were looking for work. The big change at the three 
month point is that more persons are employed - 17 percent overall and slightly 
more common for men than women - and fewer persons are as a consequence 
searching. The numbers doing casual work or explicitly reporting no search are 




























































































5. RECEIPT OF SOCIAL BENEFIT
We now look at the receipt of SB Table 3 shows that 48 percent of all 
persons in the survey were either in receipt at the date of interview or had received 
this benefit at some time since exhausting Ul. This is our estimate of the 
unconditional probability of receiving SB following a spell of Ul for the two-thirds of 
the Ul inflow with maximum or near maximum Ul entitlement The probabilities are 
very similar for men and women. Among the rest of the sample, 13 percent had 
claimed but not received benefit and 39 percent had never claimed
Eligibility for SB depends on a test of household income per capita, but if 
eligibility is awarded SB is paid at single flat-rate equal to 80 percent of the 
minimum pension. Since the level of Ul varies (it is a complicated piece-wise linear 
function of past wages - see Micklewright and Nagy, 1994) the level of SB relative to 
Ul previously paid does however vary Information on this is given in Table 4 On 
average, SB replaces just over two-thirds of Ul for men and just over three-quarters 
for women. The higher figure for women is on account of their lower levels of Ul 
which in turn reflect lower wages when in work. A quarter of SB recipients lose 
comparatively little benefit when switching from Ul to SB - the top quartile of the 
distribution is over 80 percent in both cases. Another quarter, on the other hand, 
lose about half their benefit (men) or a third (women).
Table 5 shows the reasons for non-receipt reported by the 13 percent of 
individuals who claimed SB unsuccessfully. The most important reason by a long 
way is that family income was too high, in other words the income-test was failed. 
This accounts for 60 percent of unsuccessful claims by men and 76 percent by 
women. The higher figure for women is in line with the gender differences in 
earnings and labour force participation - women are more likely to be married to 
men who work than vice versa and husbands’ earnings are higher on average than 
wives. Some 5 percent of claimants report finding a job before their claim was 
determined and another 10 percent report that the decision was still to be made. 
Decisions on SB claims are taken at what are typically monthly meetings of village 




























































































This leaves the 40 percent of Ul exhausters who did not make any claim to 
SB. The reasons they report for not doing this are given in Table 6. Overall, 1 in 5 
say they did not do so because their family income was too high, and as in Table 5 
the figure is notably higher for women A larger proportion of women than men said 
they did not claim because of their own income -1 9  percent compared to 12 percent 
- which is rather surprising, and inconsistent, for example, with the higher incidence 
of casual work among men than women shown in Table 2. The most important 
reported reason for not claiming SB however was a belief that a job would soon be 
found, and hence presumably that the procedure was not worth it. Very few persons 
reported that the procedure for making a claim was too complicated
We summarise the characteristics of those receiving SB by estimating a 
binary logit model of the probability of receipt at any time following exhaustion. We 
restrict estimation to those who after two months were still in one of three categories 
treated as the base group for the estimation of the post-exhaustion hazard in 
Figures 6-11, namely doing casual work, looking for a job, or inactivity. We restrict 
the analysis to this group since we want to remove those persons who got jobs 
reasonably quickly (or moved to other labour market states) and thus had no need 
for SB. Thus estimated effects should largely reflect the probabilities of claim and 
qualification for those who are not excluded through regaining employment
The explanatory variables are a mixture of continuous and dummy variables. 
The estimated marginal effect of turning on any dummy on the probability of 
receiving SB is approximated by dividing its estimated parameter by four (assuming 
a base probability of 0.5). When applied to the coefficient of the county 
unemployment rate, this calculation also gives an estimate of a one percentage 
point change in unemployment.
Age is entered in a quadratic which performs reasonably for men with a 
maximum at age 42 but which is quite insignificant for women. We are as yet 
unable to interpret this pattern. Increased educational level of the claimant has a 
strong negative effect for both sexes (somewhat better determined for men). 
Incomplete primary schooling (very common among the unemployed) raises the 
probability of SB compared to the base of primary schooling by some 20 percentage 




























































































probability for men by about 20 percent We suspect this reflects, at least in part, 
higher earnings levels of household members other than the spouse who are 
employed (spouse’s earnings are entered explicitly), which reduces the probability 
of passing the SB income-test. The number of employed household members not 
surprisingly has a strong negative impact, one such person reducing the SB 
probability by about 10 percent. The number of old age pensioners also has a 
negative impact which appears similar to that of employed persons, but this is 
misleading since we control explicitly for the earnings of the spouse (When this 
earnings variable is excluded, the number of employed members has an effect that 
is double that of the number of pensioners, presumably since pensions bring in less 
income to the household than earnings.) Persons on “social incomes” (such as 
disability pension) again have a negative impact on the probability of receipt, but the 
impact is not great The negative effect of what are often small increases in 
household income are in part compensated by the positive impact on increasing 
household size (qualification for SB depends on a test of per capita household 
income). By raising household size, dependent children should increase the 
probability of SB by their negative impact on per capita income but on the other 
hand should reduce it since a quite generous universal family allowance system 
exists in Hungary, which has a positive effect on family income In practice, we see 
that the number of dependent children has a significant effect only for women (why 
this is the case is not clear) and it is negative, one child reducing the probability of 
receipt by up to 10 percent points. Marital status has a significant effect only for 
men however, and it is positive, although not very well determined.
The only income that we directly observe is the monthly earnings of the 
spouse and this has a very significant impact, as one would expect. The average 
value of this variable is about 21,000 forints for wives and 27,000 for husbands 
Evaluating at these values and at the means of the dependent variable, the 
estimated elasticity of the probability of receiving SB to spouse s earnings is 0.34 for 
men and 0.64 for men.
Perhaps the greatest surprise is the effect of the county unemployment rate 
variable. We expected this to be insignificant, since we are controlling for most of 




























































































probability of getting a job (and hence increased need for SB) by excluding from 
estimation those who got a job within two months. The impact is quite large (and 
well-determined) - a one percentage point increase in unemployment increases the 
probability of getting SB by 3-4 percent (county unemployment rates range from 5 to 
19 percent) Perhaps local governments are more lenient in their adjudication of 
claims in areas of high unemployment. Finally, controlling for unemployment rate, 
the SB probability seems to be notably higher in Budapest (by up to 10 percentage 
points), another result for which we as yet have no explanation
6. SUMMARY AND FURTHER DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH
This paper has provided a technical report on our survey of Ul exhausters 
and has given some very preliminary results. As regards the latter, the following 
points have emerged. It should be remembered that the survey was not a random 
sample of Ul exhausters from all work history groups and was restricted to the two- 
thirds of individuals in the inflow with maximum or near maximum Ul entitlement 
periods.
• The conditional probability of getting a job rises five- or six-fold in the week 
immediately following Ul exhaustion before falling back to a level fairly similar to that 
in the last few weeks of Ul receipt, which in turn appears a little higher than in earlier 
weeks The number of individuals who get a job in the first post-exhaustion week 
are however rather small - only 2 percent of the full Ul inflow cohort in the two 
relevant work history groups
• There is also a big spike in the hazard of exit to labour market states other 
than work in the week following exhaustion, repeating a spike found at 6 months 
during the Ul entitlement period. These spikes seem to be caused by persons 
moving off to other forms of income support, for example pensions or child care 




























































































•  Income tested Social Benefit (SB) was received by half of Ul exhausters 
Benefit income among those receiving SB fell on average at Ul exhaustion by 
slightly less than one-third for men and one-quarter for women.
Further research with these data will follow several directions First, we need 
to distinguish between the hazards of those eligible to SB and those who are not. 
The approach of Ul exhaustion clearly should have different implications for these 
two groups. Second, we need to investigate the wages of those who obtain jobs, 
something we can only do with the follow-up survey sample. Those who obtain jobs 
immediately after Ul exhaustion might be expected to have accepted wages at little 
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Table 1: Characteristics of Ul recipients with 12 or 11 months eligibility period
12 months eligibility period 11 months eligibility period
total exhaus- respon- total exhaus- respon-





46.0 49.0 48.0 60.2 57.8 58.7
primary and below 398 40.3 40.4 34.4 404 40.1
vocational 33.2 35.6 36.0 40.3 38 5 38 9
secondary 23.7 21.9 21.4 21.5 18 7 18.8
higher 3.3 2.2 2.2 3.8 2.6 2.2




2.2 3.1 2.8 9.1 12.6 12.2
Budapest 10.3 9.5 8.7 17.1 16.6 16.5
highest unemploy­
ment counties
17.3 22.0 22.1 14.7 17.8 17.4
Averages: 




19897 19020 18626* 19101 18559 18628
Last monthly net Ul 
(forints)
No. of observations
10670 10206 10116* 10372 9937 10015
22611 9713 3141 6059 2697 1517
Note: An asterisk indicates that the difference between the averages of the sample and 
non-sample groups of exhausters is significant at the 5 percent level (using an F-test). 
Distributions by sex, education, termination of last employment and region were compared 




























































































Table 2. Labour Market State of Ul Exhausters 1 Week and 3 Months after Date 
of Exhaustion
1 week after exhaustion 
Men Women Total
3 months after exhaustion 
Men Women Total
Employment 5.5 5.3 5.4 18 1 15 3 16.7
Public work employment 0.3 0.0 0.1 2.0 0.5 1.3
Entrepreneur 1.5 0.4 1.0 2.8 1.5 2.1
Family worker 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.7 1.1 0.9
Casual worker searching 
for a job
8.7 3.2 6.0 8.2 2.4 5.3
Casual worker not 
searching for a job
1.0 0.7 0.9 1.2 0.7 0.9
Child and invalid care 
allowance
0.1 3.4 1.7 0.2 4.9 2.6
Pension 3.9 3.2 3.6 5.6 4.4 5.0
Student 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2
Searching for a job 70.5 68.3 69.4 54.1 54.9 54.5
Not searching for a job 7.6 14.0 10.8 6.7 133 10.0
Training scheme 
participant
0.2 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.5
Source: 1995 Ul Exhausters' Survey microdata 




























































































Table 3. Social Benefit Receipt at Date of Interview
Men Women Total
Received at date of 
interview
40 7 388 39.8
Received earlier 9.6 6.8 8.2
Unsuccessful claim 11.4 144 12.9
Did not claim 38.3 40.1 39.2
Total 100.0 100 0 100.0
Note: Percentages based on weighted data
Table 4. Level of Social Benefit at Date of Interview as a Percent of 
Unemployment Insurance previously received
Men Women
Bottom decile 48 54
Lower quartile 55 69
Median 68 83
Upper quartile 82 83
Top decile 83 84
Mean 68 77




























































































Table 5. Reasons for Non-Receipt of Social Benefit if Claim Unsuccessful
Men Women Total
Family income too high 60.1 75.6 68.7
Had own income 4 9 4.5 4.7
Found a job in a short 
time
6.8 3.6 5.0
Eligible for pension 3.3 1.8 2.4
Claim not yet determined 109 8.8 9 8
Other reason 9.1 3.0 5.7
Don’t know/no answer 5.0 2.8 3.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: Percentages based on weighted data
Table 6. Reasons for Not Claiming Social Benefit
Men Women Total
Family income too high
Had own income 
Expected to find a job in 
a short time 
Eligible for pension 











































































































Table 7. Estimates of Logit parameters of Probability of SB Receipt for those 





Constant -3.692 -3.9 0 034 0.1
Age 0.168 3.7 0.022 -0 3
Age2
Educational level
-0.002 -3.1 -0 001 -0.7
incomplete primary 0.821 2.8 1.160 3.3
vocational -0 398 -3.1 -0.169 -1.2
vocational secondary -0.689 -3.5 -0.450 -2.6
general secondary -0.731 -2.4 -0.248 -1.4
higher -1.363 -3.4 -1.691 -3.0
County unemployment 
rate in June 1995
0.146 8.9 0.110 6.3
Budapest
Household characteristics
0.450 2 2 0.471 2.3
no. of dependent 
children of respondent
0.091 1.3 0.377 4.8
no employed -0492 -5.3 -0.438 -4.2
no. of old-age pension 
recipients
-0 448 -3.9 -0.540 -3.3
no. of regular social 
income recipients
-0.251 -2.0 -0.246 1.5
Married 0.249 1.6 -0.028 -0.2
Spouse working but wage 
not reported













































































































Figure 1. Outflows from Ul receipt. July 1992 -  June 1995
Notes: 1. Figures include Career Beginners benefit recipients
2. Outflow rates are calculated in percentage of stock of Ul recipients a) leaving for 
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